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Gionis: The Liquidating Fiduciary: A Hidden Exception to WARN Act Liabili

THE LIQUIDATING FIDUCIARY: A HIDDEN
EXCEPTION TO WARN ACT LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The WARN Act: An Overview
The WARN Act' was enacted in 1988 following some highly
publicized nationwide plant closings.2 Its purpose, according to the
Department of Labor ("DOL"), is to:
provide[] protection to workers, their families and communities by
requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in
advance of plant closings and mass layoffs. Advance notice provides
workers and their families some transition time to adjust to the
prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs
and, if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow
these workers to successfully compete in the job market. WARN also
provides for notice to State dislocated worker units so that dislocated
worker assistance can be promptly provided. 3
In other words, the Act's purpose is to provide employees with

sufficient notice to afford them enough time to prepare for pending
unemployment.4 The Act attempts to achieve this goal by requiring
employers to give written notice to its employees at least sixty days prior
to either a plant closing or mass layoff.' While this requirement is
generally applicable in most situations, the Act explicitly provides
several statutory exceptions, which are further discussed below.
While the WARN Act is a federal statute, it has several state
counterparts which also impose employee layoff and plant closing

1. See generally Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (2012) [hereinafter Code]; see
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006) [hereinafter
WARN Act or WARN].
2. Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A Warn Act Road Map, 11 LAB. LAw. 273 (1996).
3. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (2012).
4.

BROOK BOYD, HIRING AND FIRING

5.

Id.

§ 9.03

(2009), availableat LEXIS.
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notification requirements. 6 These statutes, which are modeled after the
federal WARN Act, are sometimes referred to as mini-WARN Acts.7 In
fact, the standards imposed by some of these state statutes are even more
stringent than those imposed by the federal WARN Act itself.8
i.

Requirements Under the WARN Act

Under the WARN Act, it is generally required that employers give
employees at least sixty days' notice before closing down a plant or
instituting a mass layoff.9 In several situations that are accounted for in
the language of the Act, however, notice is expressly not required.10
These provisions are known as the statutory exceptions to WARN Act
liability. "
Generally, the reach of WARN Act liability spans to cover any
"business enterprise" 1 2 conducting either a plant closing or mass layoff,
and that employs (1) 100 or more employees, not counting part-time
employees;1 or (2) 100 or more employees, counting part-time
6.

Id.

7. See id. States that have these mini-WARN Acts include California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Tennessee, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400 -1408 (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51n-o (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 394B-1 - 394B-13 (1993);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. (65/10) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-616(West 2009); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (2007)); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. §§ 11-301 - 11-304 (West
2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 151A §§ 71A - F (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116L.976
(West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:21-2 (West 2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 860 (McKinney Supp.
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 285A.510-16 (West 2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 50-1-601 - 04
(2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 2002).
8. See e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 860 (McKinney Supp. 2013). This New York Mini-WARN
statute states that "[a]n employer may not order a mass layoff, relocation, or employment loss,
unless, at least ninety days before the order takes effect, the employer gives written notice of the
order ..... Id. at § 860-b. The federal WARN Act, on the other hand, requires only sixty days'
notice. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006).
10. Id. § 2103.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 2101(a). The term "business enterprise" is seemingly the most glaring reason that
there is such tension between the Bankruptcy Code and the WARN Act. While the reasons for this
are discussed in more detail later on in this piece, it is important to note that the WARN Act sets
forth the term "business enterprise" as a description of what constitutes an "employer" for purposes
of WARN Act liability. Thus, the general idea that lends in favor of the liquidating fiduciary
exception is that when a company is acting as a liquidating fiduciary for bankruptcy purposes, it
sheds its title as an employer and therefore escapes the scope of the WARN Act. Id.
13. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 264.03(2) (2012), available at LEXIS.
Part time employees are defined as "employee[s] who [are] employed for an average of fewer than
20 hours per week or who ha[ve] been employed for fewer than 6 of the 12 months preceding the
date on which notice is required." 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(8). It is important to note that "the definition
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employees, as long as their aggregate hours worked in a week equals
greater than 4,000.14 The Act defines the terms "plant closing" and
"mass layoff" as follows.
"[P]lant closing" means the permanent or temporary shutdown of a
single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units
within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an
employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time
employees . . . "[M]ass layoff' means a reduction in force which

(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment
during any 30-day period for
(i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time
employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees)[.J

5

In determining whether an employer has enough employees to
actually trigger the WARN Act, employees are counted as of the date
when WARN Act notice was first required.16 This only holds true,
however, when the resulting number is representative of the "ordinary or
average" number of employees working at the company.17 Also
included in this number are workers who have been only temporarily
laid off or are "reasonably expected" to be called back to work at some
time in the future.' 8 The term "employment loss," as used in subsection
(B) of section 2101(a)(1) set forth above is defined in section
2101(a)(6).19 According to this definition, an employment loss is
established when there is a (1) termination of employment "other than a
discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement[;]" (2) a layoff

of part-time employees thus includes many "seasonal" employees." LAREAU, at §264.03(2) (2012).
14. Id. at 264.03(1).
15. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2)-(3).
16. 20 C.F.R. § 639.5 (a)(2) (2012).

17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
See 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(6).
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that is meant to last for longer than 6 months; 20 or (3) a reduction in
work hours by more than fifty percent "during each month of any six
month period[.]" 2 1 When two separate groups of employees lose
employment at a single site of employment, moreover, and each group is
comprised of too few a number of employees to trigger WARN Act
liability, the employment loss might still be considered either a plant
closing or mass layoff when the aggregate number of employees from
the separate groups exceeds the minimum requirement, and each of the
employment losses occurred within a 90-day period.22 Under the
WARN Act, employers can rebut these "aggregate" claims only by
demonstrating that "the employment losses [were] the result of separate
and distinct actions and causes and [were] not an attempt by the
employer to evade [WARN] requirements."23 Importantly, the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) indicates that the 90-day rule requires
employers to "look ahead 90 days and behind 90 days to determine
whether employment actions, each of which separately would not trigger
WARN coverage, would in the aggregate meet the minimum numbers
for a plant closing or mass layoff."2 4 Courts have held, however, that
"[1]ayoffs that are occasioned by a continuing and accelerating economic
demise are not the result of separate and distinct causes." 25
Once an employer ascertains that it has triggered WARN Act notice
obligations, the next step is to actually notify the affected employees. 26
Section 2101(a) lays out the employers' notice procedure, and states that
20. It is important to note, however, that § 2102(c) also discusses what constitutes an
employment loss. This section states that a
layoff of more than 6 months which, at its outset, was announced to be a layoff of 6
months or less, shall be treated as an employment loss under this chapter unless (1) the
extension beyond 6 months is caused by business circumstances (including
unforeseeable changes in price or cost) not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
initial layoff; and (2) notice is given at the time it becomes reasonably foreseeable that
the extension beyond 6 months will be required.
Id. §2102(c).
21. Id. § 2101(a)(6).
22. Id. § 2102(d).
23. Id.
24. LAREAU, supra note 13, at 264.03(2) (emphasis added) (citing 20 C.F.R. 639.5(a)(ii)).
25. Id. (quoting Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hospital, 217 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2000)).
26. The term "affected employees" is defined in §2101(a)(5) as "employees who may
reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant
closing or mass layoff by their employer." 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (2006). According to the DOL,
moreover, the term "affected employees" includes "managerial and supervisory employees, but does
not include business partners." 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(e). It also does not include employees
compensated by another employer but working at the facility in question. See Bradley v. Sequoyah
Fuels Corp., 847 F. Supp. 863, 868 (E.D. Okla. 1994). The DOL still suggests that every employee
be given notice, even if not explicitly required under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §639.6(b).
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notice must be provided in writing. 27 It also mandates that the written
notice be served to:
(1) each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the
notice or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected
employee;28 and
(2) the State or entity designated by the State to carry out rapid
response activities under section 2864(a)(2)(A) of this title, and the
chief elected official of the unit of local government within which such
closing or layoff is to occur.29
The C.F.R. also lays out several separate rules governing proper
notice depending on whether it is given to an individual or an
individual's representative. According to 20 C.F.R. 639.7(c), WARN
notices to representatives must contain:
(1) The name and address of the employment site where the plant
closing or mass layoff will occur, and the name and telephone number
of a company official to contact for further information;
(2) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be
permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a
effect;
that
to
statement
(3) The expected date of the first separation and the anticipated
separations;
making
for
schedule
(4) The job titles of positions to be affected and the names of the
jobs.
affected
holding
currently
workers
The notice may include additional information useful to the employees
such as information on available dislocated worker assistance , and, if
the planned action is expected to be temporary, the estimated duration,

27. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a).
28. Employees who are already on layoff and have a reasonable expectation to be recalled
when the employer decides to order a mass layoff or plant closing are also entitled to notice.
LAREAU, supra note 13, at § 264.03(7) (citing Kildea v. Electro-Wire Products, Inc., 144 F.3d 400,
405 (6th Cir. 1998)) (holding that an objective standard must be used in determining when a
reasonable expectation exists, and that said standard is "whether a "reasonable employee," in the
same or similar circumstances as the employees involved in the case at hand, would be expected to
be recalled.").
29. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a).
30. Employers may, in the alternative, give notice to the state dislocated worker unit and the
chief elected official may by providing, in writing, "the name and address of the site involved, the
name and telephone number of the company official to contact for further information, the expected
date of the first separation and the number of affected employees." LAREAU, supra note 13, at §
264.03(8).
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if known. 3 1
Furthermore, under DOL Regulations, notice to each employee who
does not have a representative must be "written in language
understandable to the employees" 32 and must contain:
A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be
permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a
statement
to
that
effect;
(2) The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff will
commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be
separated;
(3) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist;
(4) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact
for further information. 33
ii. Employee Remedies for WARN Act Violations
The WARN Act provides that employers who violate its provisions
"shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment
loss as a result of such closing or layoff."34 Liability consists of back
pay for each day of the employer's violation of the Act.35 The amount of
back pay that the employer owes each employee, moreover, is defined as
"not less than the higher of" (1) the average rate of pay that the
employee received during the last three years of employment; and (2)
the final regular rate that the employee received prior to either the plant
closing or mass layoff.36 Employers are also liable to employees for
benefits under employee benefit plans, which include medical expenses
that arose "during the employment loss which would have been covered
under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had not
occurred."37 The liability is calculated "up to a maximum of 60 days,"
and is never calculated to be more than "one-half the number of days the
employee was employed by the employer."3 8 The amount for which an
employer is liable under the Act is reduced by (1) all wages that the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

20 C.F.R. § 639.7(c) (2012).
See e.g., Nagel v. Sykes Enters., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196 (D. N.D. Aug. 25, 2005).
20 C.F.R. § 639.7(d).
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
Id. § 2104(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 2104(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 2104 (a)(1)(B).
Id.
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employer paid the employee during the violation period;39 (2) "voluntary
and unconditional payments" by the employer that are not required
under law; 40 and (3) payments by the employer to a trustee or third party
"on behalf of and attributable to the employee for the period of the
violation.""'
Therefore, while the WARN Act does offer guidance as to how to
calculate an employee's wages for purposes of WARN Act violations,42
it does not specify the hours per day by which to multiply those wages.
Courts have generally held, however, that "liability is based on
workdays within the sixty day notice period",43 and therefore typically
multiply employees' hourly rates by eight hours to calculate appropriate
levels of back pay.4
Unions are also allowed to bring actions against employers for
WARN Act violations. 45 As part of the costs of bringing such an action,
prevailing parties may be awarded attorney's fees.46 WARN Act
remedies are exclusive, and the Act therefore does not authorize courts
to enjoin plant closings or layoffs.47
iii. Exceptions to WARN Act Liability
The above overview focuses mostly on circumstances under which
employers are subject to the WARN Act, and are therefore required to
notify employees of pending mass layoffs or plant closings. This
section, however, concentrates more on the main focus of this note:
exceptions to WARN Act liability.
39. Id. § 2104 (a)(2)(A).
40. Id. § 2104 (a)(2)(B). Moreover, employers are not credited for payments required under
any preexisting severance pay plans, or for severance payments provided in exchange for release of
claims agreements. LAREAU, supra note 13, at § 264.03(10).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2)(C).
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. LAREAU, supra note 13, at § 264.03(10) (citing UMW v. Eighty-Four Mining Co., 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 25039 (3d Cir. 2005)). However, there is some inconsistency regarding whether
the relevant standard should be based on working days or calendar days. See Marques v. Telles
Ranch, Inc., 131 F.3d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that seasonal workers suffered
"employment loss" in April when they were not recalled, instead of in November when their
seasonal work usually ended).
44. BOYD, supra note 4, at § 6 (citing Washington v. Aircap Industries, 860 F. Supp. 307,
312-313 (D. S.C. 1994). Notably, some courts have held that tips, holiday pay and overtime pay
should all be included when calculating back pay. See UMW v. Martinka Coal Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d
521, 527-28 (N.D. W. Va. 1999).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 2104 (a)(5).
46. Id. § 2104(a)(6).
47. Id. § 2104(b).
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There are several exceptions to WARN Act liability. 4 8 Indeed,
three of these exceptions can be found in the text of the Act itself.49 The
fourth exception, however, is not codified in the WARN Act, and is
therefore seemingly lesser known than its explicitly stated
counterparts.50 The remainder of this section will first provide an
overview of the exceptions that are contained within the WARN Act. It
will then introduce and provide a primer of the fourth exception to
WARN Act liability - the liquidating fiduciary exception."
1. The Faltering Company Exception
The faltering company exception is the first exception to WARN
Act obligations that is specifically listed in the text of the WARN Act.52
It serves to reduce the length of the notification period during which
employers are required to notify employees of pending layoffs or plant
closings. The exception states that
(a]n employer may order the shutdown of a single site of employment
before the conclusion of the 60-day period if as of the time that notice
would have been required the employer was actively seeking capital or
business which, if obtained, would have enabled the employer to avoid
or postpone the shutdown and the employer reasonably and in good
faith believed that giving the notice required would have precluded the
employer from obtaining the needed capital or business. 54
According to the C.F.R., the faltering company exception applies
only to plant closings, and not mass layoffs. 5 Moreover, it states that
the exceptions should be "narrowly construed."56 The C.F.R. then goes
on to list four requirements that must be met for an employer to qualify
for the faltering company exception. 57 The first is that the employer
must have been "actively seeking capital or business at the time that 60-

48. See id. §2102(b).
49. Id.
50. Preston M. Strosnider & Gershom R. Smith, The WARN Act Exception You've Never
Heard of,HR ADVISOR, 13 (November/December ed. 2008).
51. Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1).
53. Id.
54. Id
55. 20 C.F.R. §639.9(a) (2013).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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day notice would have been required."5 The second mandates that there
must have been "a realistic opportunity to obtain the financing or
business sought." 5 9 The third requires a showing that the sought-after
financing or business, if obtained, would have enabled the employer to
"avoid or postpone the shutdown."60 And finally, the fourth requires that
the employer must have "reasonably and in good faith" believed that
giving the required notice "would have precluded the employer from
obtaining the needed capital or business." 6 1 To satisfy this good faith
requirement, an employer must "objectively demonstrate that it
reasonably thought that a potential customer or source of financing
would have been unwilling to provide the new business or capital if
notice were given . ...

62

2. The Unforeseeable Business Circumstances Exception
The unforeseeable business circumstances exception is the second
exception expressly stated in the Act.63 It, like the faltering company
exception, reduces the length of the notification period during which
employers are required to notify employees of pending layoffs or plant
closings.64 The exception states that "[a]n employer may order a plant
closing or mass layoff before the conclusion of the 60-day period if the
closing or mass layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not
reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been

58. Id. §639.9(a)(1). This, according to the C.F.R., means that the
employer must have been seeking financing or refinancing through the arrangement of
loans, the issuance of stocks, bonds, or other methods of internally generated financing;
or the employer must have been seeking additional money, credit, or business through
any other commercially reasonable method. The employer must be able to identify
specific actions taken to obtain capital or business.

Id.
59. Id. § (a)(2).
60. Id § (a)(3). That is, the employer must be able to "objectively demonstrate that the
amount of capital or the volume of new business sought would have enabled the employer to keep
the facility, operating unit, or site open for a reasonable period of time." Id.
6 1. Id. § (a)(4).
62. Id. This requirement can be satisfied if the employer shows that the financing or business
source would not choose to do business with (1) a troubled company; or (2) a company whose
workforce would be looking for other jobs. It is also important to note that actions of an employer
relying on this exception will be "viewed in a company-wide context." Id (stating that "a company
with access to capital markets or with cash reserves may not avail itself of this exception by looking
solely at the financial condition of the facility, operating unit, or site to be closed.").
63. 29 U.S.C. 2102(b)(2)(A) (2006).
64. Id
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required."65 While this exception, standing alone, seems to lack
sufficient guidance for consistent application, the C.F.R. again helps to
add some clarity. The C.F.R. starts by providing that the "unforeseeable
business circumstances" exception applies only to plant closings and
mass layoffs caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable at the time that 60-day notice would have been required.66
According to the C.F.R., an "important indicator" that a business
circumstance is not reasonably foreseeable is that "the circumstance is
caused by some sudden, dramatic, and unexpected action or condition
outside the employer's control."67 As such, the "test" for determining
foreseeability is focused primarily on the employer's business
judgment.68
3. The Natural Disaster Exception
The natural disaster exception is the third and final exception that is
expressly stated in the WARN Act. 6 9 This exception, unlike the first
two, completely relieves, rather than delays, the employers' obligations
to provide notice to employees.70 It states that "[n]o notice under this
Act . .. shall be required if the plant closing or mass layoff is due to any

form of natural disaster, such as a flood, earthquake, or the drought
currently ravaging the farmlands of the United States."71 The exception
is, however, qualified by §2102(b)(3), which requires that an employer
relying on section 2102 to except itself from giving WARN notice "shall
give as much notice as is practicable .... 72 According to the C.F.R.,
the natural disaster exception applies to both plant closings and mass
65. Id
66. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b) (2013).
67. Id. §639.9(b)(1). This subsection also provides several examples and provides that
[a] principal client's sudden and unexpected termination of a major contract with the
employer, a strike at a major supplier of the employer, and an unanticipated and dramatic
major economic downturn might each be considered a business circumstance that is not
reasonably foreseeable. A government ordered closing of an employment site that occurs
without prior notice also may be an unforeseeable business circumstance.

Id.
68. Id. § 639.9(b)(2). "The employer must exercise such commercially reasonable business
judgment as would a similarly situated employer in predicting the demands of its particular market.
The employer is not required, however, to accurately predict general economic conditions that also
may affect demand for its products or services." Id
69. 29 U.S.C. 2102(b)(2)(B) (2006).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 2101(b)(3). This section also requires that employers give a brief statement of the
basis for reducing the notification period. Id
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layoffs due to "any form of natural disaster"7 3 This seems to set forth a
proximate cause standard by which employers bear the responsibility of
demonstrating that the plant closing or mass layoff was a "direct result
of a natural disaster." 74 Where a plant closing or mass layoff occurs as
an "indirect result of a natural disaster," however, the exception does not
apply. Rather, under these circumstances, the C.F.R. recommends that
employers attempt to seek relief using the unforeseeable business
circumstances exception provided under subsection (b).
II. THE LIQUIDATING FIDUCIARY EXCEPTION: RECONCILING
THE WARN ACT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The issue this section aims to analyze is whether an employer that
is a debtor in possession ("DIP") in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding
is a liquidating fiduciary or a business enterprise. Because the WARN
Act applies only to business enterprises, the more specific issue is
whether a company that has attained liquidating fiduciary status is
exempt from WARN Act liability due solely to the fact that it is no
longer operating as a business. The answer, of course, is "it depends."
But when courts hold that an employer is relieved of all WARN Act
obligations due to the fact that it was not acting as a business enterprise
at the time of the challenged layoffs or plant closings, the situation is
classified as what is colloquially referred to as the liquidating fiduciary
exception to WARN Act liability. 76 Interestingly, unlike the exceptions
listed above, the liquidating fiduciary exception does not appear
anywhere in the text of the WARN Act. Rather, it is judicially created
and based almost entirely on courts' interpretations of the DOL's final
regulation carrying out provisions of the WARN Act.
To date,
however, only a handful of courts have addressed issues relating to the
liquidating fiduciary exception, and the line distinguishing a liquidating
fiduciary from a business enterprise is still relatively obscure. 79 There
73. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c). Any form of natural disaster is a broad rule, and 20 C.F.R.
639.9(c)(1) lists several specific natural disasters as examples as those that qualify. This section
provides
that
"[fjloods, earthquakes, droughts, storms, tidal waves or tsunamis and similar effects of nature are
natural disasters under this provision." Id.
74. Id. § 639.9(c)(3).
75. Id.
76. 54 Fed. Reg. 16042, 16045 (April 20, 1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639).
77. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2006).
78. 54 Fed. Reg. at 16042, 16045.
79. See generally Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of United Healthcare Sys. v.
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are, however, several cases that have helped shed some light on the
defining characteristics of liquidating fiduciaries and business
enterprises. Of these, the most notable are In re United Health Care
System, 80 a Third Circuit case from 1999, and In re Jamesway
Corporation, a case from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York decided in the same year. Both of these cases are
discussed at length below.
A. Relevance of the Liquidating FiduciaryException
The decisions in United HealthCare and Jamesway are important
not only because of the impact they have on WARN Act claims against
Chapter 11 debtors in possession, but also because of the potential
impact they might have on a company's decision to schedule its layoffs
and plant closings to take place before rather than after the employer
files a petition for bankruptcy. 82 Generally, courts that have considered
the exception have found that an employee's successful WARN Act
claim against an employer is given third priority status in a bankruptcy
case.83 Traditionally, this equaled up to $4,300 for the employee, and,
under the Code, the remainder of the claim is considered a general
unsecured claim. 84 Unsecured claims typically entitle employees to no
priority, and are often paid at pennies on the dollar. On the other hand,
when the firing or plant closing takes place after the bankruptcy petition
is filed, courts have generally held that an employee's WARN Act claim
against an employer is given first priority administrative expense status,
which typically entitles the claimant to satisfaction of its full claim
before any payment is made to unsecured creditors.86
Based on these rules, it seems logical that employers who are
considering filing for Chapter 11 would be better off conducting their
layoffs pre-petition rather than post-petition in order to pay the least
United Healthcare Sys., Inc.; Med. Staff (In re United Healthcare Sys. Inc.), 200 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.
1999).
8 0. Id.
81. Barnett v. Jamesway Corp. (In re Jamesway Corp.), 235 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999).
82. Jeffrey Klein, WARN Act Obligations In Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, WEL, GOTSHAL &
MANAGES (Apr. 3, 2000), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub-3819.
83. Id.; see also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Hanlin Group, Inc. (In re Hanlin Group,
Inc.), 176 B.R. 329, 333-34 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (citing In re Cargo Inc., 138 B.R. 923, 927
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) (WARN wages are earned at the time the employment is terminated).
84. See Klein, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. Id
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possible amount of money to employees with potential WARN Act
claims against them. But now, in light of United HealthCare and
Jamesway, it is possible that employers, under certain circumstances,
might be wise to instead delay their layoffs or plant closings until after
filing a petition in bankruptcy in hopes of completely relieving
themselves of WARN Act liability by qualifying as liquidating
fiduciaries instead of business enterprises.
Of course, the most effective way to avoid WARN Act liability is
simply to comply with the provisions of the WARN Act by giving
proper notice to employees before conducting layoffs or plant closings.
But there are certain situations where corporate employers considering
Chapter 11 bankruptcy are experiencing such extreme financial trouble
that it is impossible or at least impracticable to give their employees the
It is under these
full notice required under the WARN Act.
circumstances that the liquidating fiduciary exception, as interpreted by
the courts in United HealthCare and Jamesway, can affect an
employer's decision to layoff its employees or shutdown its plants
before, rather than after, filing a petition in bankruptcy. 89
B. The DOL Commentary: LiquidatingFiduciaryvs. Business
Enterprise
In May 1989, the DOL published a final regulation carrying out the
provisions of the WARN Act.90 In its analysis of the final rule and
comments, the DOL shed some light on the definition of an employer as
provided under section 2101(a)(1) of the WARN Act.91 The Act defines
an employer as any business enterprise that employs (A) 100 or more
employees, excluding part-time employees; or (B) 100 or more
employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week
(exclusive of hours of overtime)."92 As the WARN Act itself is
seemingly devoid of any guidance on how to treat entities that have filed
for bankruptcy, the DOL attempted to clarify the issue in its
commentary. There, it stated:
[a]nother commenter suggested that "fiduciaries" in bankruptcy
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
54 Fed. Reg. 16042 (April 20, 1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639).
Id.; 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(1) (2006).
29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(1).
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proceedings should be excluded from the definition of employer. Since
adequate protections for fiduciaries are available through the
bankruptcy courts, the Department does not think it appropriate to
change the regulations to address this situation. Further, DOL agrees
that a fiduciary whose sole function in the bankruptcy process is to
liquidate a failed business for the benefit of creditors does not succeed
to the notice obligations of the former employer because the fiduciary
is not operating a "business enterprise" in the normal commercial
sense. In other situations, where the fiduciary may continue to operate
the business for the benefit of creditors, the fiduciary would succeed to
the WARN obligations of the employer precisely because the fiduciary
continues the business in operation.
Therefore, according to the DOL, a company that is operating for
the sole purpose of liquidating as part of a bankruptcy proceeding is not
subject to WARN Act requirements.94 The logic, it seems, is that a
business doing nothing but liquidating for the purpose of paying its
creditors cannot be considered a "business enterprise," and therefore, by
definition, cannot qualify as an employer under the WARN Act. 95 It
therefore follows that a business that is no longer acting in a business
capacity is not responsible for its failure to provide notice prior to the
liquidation process, even if the business in question is the same as the
business that formerly employed the terminated workers.96 It is the
above quoted DOL language that courts have relied upon in attempting
to develop and understand the scope and application of the liquidating
fiduciary exception to WARN Act liability. 97 The first seminal
liquidating fiduciary case that held in favor of the employer was In re
United Health Care System,98 a Third Circuit ruling that outlined a
sliding-scale test in determining whether the employer's activities
constituted those of a business enterprise or a liquidating fiduciary. 99
C. In Re UnitedHealthcare
In In re United Healthcare, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that an employer that filed a Chapter 11 petition in
bankruptcy was no longer an employer within the meaning of the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

54 Fed. Reg. at 16042, 16045.
See id.
Strosnider & Smith, supra note 50, at 15.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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WARN Act, and was therefore not subject to WARN Act liability."
The case arose when the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of
United HealthCare System, Inc. (the "Committee") appealed a judgment
by the district court which held that United Healthcare's ("United")
former employees were entitled to WARN Act back pay with first
priority administrative statuses.101
United was a New Jersey corporation that provided hospital and
healthcare services in Newark, New Jersey.102 In 1993, United began to
experience financial difficulties, and in 1996 it began to suffer
"substantial operating losses" and encounter "trouble maintaining
essential supplies." 10 3 In an attempt to improve its financial condition,
United sought partnership and merger agreements, but was unable to
find a favorable deal. 104 Despite this failure, United's management
believed that United would be able to keep its doors open.10 In 1996,
United's board of directors approved, in good faith, the 1997 budget,
projecting positive revenues, and even a year-end surplus.1 06
Immediately following this approval, however, the board commenced
discussions with potential purchasers and partners. 0 7 While on the verge
of finding a purchaser, United's only secured creditor, Daiwa Healthco-2
L.L.C., ("Daiwa") warned United that recent financial reports had
caused it to doubt that United was in fact financially viable.'s United,
in an attempt to allay Daiwa's fears, claimed that the information in the
financial report was incorrect due to a computer error.109 Unsatisfied
with this excuse, Daiwa, on February 3, suspended all of its funding to
United." 0 As a result, United could no longer meet its operating
expenses, and was forced to close its emergency room and decrease its
patient base."' Then, ten days later, Daiwa issued a notice of default
thereby completely terminating United's funding.112 On the same day,
Blue Cross terminated the health insurance that United provided for its
100.
Sys., Inc.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of United Healthcare Sys. v. United Healthcare
(In re United Healthcare Sys. Inc.,), 200 F.3d at 179 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 171-72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
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employees. 113
Unable to continue its operations or meet its daily expenses, United
decided to hear merger proposals from four New Jersey healthcare
providers. 114 One of the potential partners, St. Barnabas, proposed to
purchase a portion of United's assets and subsequently terminate all
operations.115 Primary Healthcare was another potential partner, as it
offered to maintain United's operations and retain the majority of
United's employees.1 16 While United's medical staff, of course, voted
for the Primary Healthcare plan, the board instead chose to pursue the St.
Barnabas plan, and shut down the hospital.'1 7 On February 18, United
surrendered its certificates of need, and filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition in bankruptcy.1 18 On the same day, United also provided its
employees with the proper sixty days WARN Act notice. 119 At that
point, because all of United's patients had already been either transferred
to St. Barnabas or sent home, United's employees were unable to
perform their normal duties.120 Instead they were charged with tasks
such as cleaning the hospital, taking inventory, and preparing the
company's assets for sale.121
On March 4, the Committee filed a motion with the bankruptcy
court requesting an order that United immediately terminate all of its
employees. 12 2 On March 6, before the court ruled on the motion, United
complied with the Committee's request and "informed 1,200 of its 1,300
employees that they were no longer to report to work."1 2 3 The parties
thereafter stipulated before the bankruptcy court that the February 19
post-petition WARN Act notice created a $7.3 million payroll obligation
for the sixteen days that the laid-off employees actually worked after the
WARN Act notice was given. 124 The parties could not agree, however,
as to whether the employees were entitled to back pay for the remaining
44 days, and if so, whether they were entitled to administrative claim
status under of the Bankruptcy Code.12 5
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
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The Committee argued that the employees were not entitled to back
pay because United "ceased to be an "employer" subject to the WARN
Act once it surrendered its certificates of need."1 2 6 The Committee also
argued that even if United remained an employer, it was excused from
providing notice under two of the WARN Act's listed exceptions: the
"faltering company" exception and "unforeseeable business
circumstances" exception. 12 7 Finally, the Committee argued that if the
laid off employees were entitled to back pay under the WARN Act, they
only held unsecured claims, rather than administrative claims, that were
limited to $4,000 per employee under § 507(a)(3)128 of the Bankruptcy

Code. 129
The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments and held that the
employees were entitled to back pay and should be granted
administrative claim status. 13 0 The court held that United remained an
employer post-petition because it continued to employ 1,300 people for
16 days after filing for bankruptcy.13 1 The court, in making its decision,
relied upon the DOL commentary, stating that "where the fiduciary may
continue to operate the business for the benefit of the creditors, the
fiduciary would succeed to the WARN obligations of the employers
precisely because the fiduciary continues the business in operation." 132
On appeal, the district court affirmed without explanation, stating that
United was an employer for sixteen days after filing its petition in
bankruptcy.13 3 The Committee then appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. 13 4
The Court of Appeals, applying plenary review, reversed the
District court's decision, and framed the issue as follows: "whether the
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court correctly concluded [that]

126. Id. at 174.
127. Id.
128. This section is now 507(a)(4), and caps unsecured claims at $10,000 rather than $4,000.
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012).
129. In re United, 200 F.3d at 174.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Idat 174-75. The court also rejected the Committee's arguments regarding the exceptions
that are listed in the WARN Act. The court stated that the "unforeseeable business circumstances"
exception did not apply because "there were "months of warning signals" that placed the board of
directors on notice that "United was in financial extremis."" Id. The court also stated that the
"faltering business" exception did not apply because United's ""deep, long-term and critical"
financial problems prevented it from reasonably believing new capital or business would allow it to
remain open." Id.
133. Id. at 175.
134. Id.
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United Healthcare continued as an "employer" within the meaning of the
WARN Act after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and was therefore
subject to the WARN Act notification requirements when it furloughed
its 1,200 employee on March 6, 1997.",135 The court, characterizing this
as an issue of statutory construction, first analyzed the language of the
WARN Act itself.136 It found, however, that the language defining an
employer is general and of no significant help in determining whether an
employer is subject to WARN Act obligations.13 7 While the court
recognized that United undoubtedly employed the requisite number of
employees, it found that it was unclear whether United remained a
business enterprise after it surrendered its certificates of need, stopped
treating patients, and entered bankruptcy to liquidate, rather than
reorganize, because each of these activities "precluded [United] from
performing the everyday business functions of a hospital and health care
service."138 The court also acknowledged the flip side of this point,
stating that despite those events United remained a corporation that
employed a substantial number of people for 16 days after filing for
bankruptcy.139 Still, the court was unable to adequately rely on the
WARN Act's plain language and therefore shifted its analysis to a
consideration of agency regulations and relevant jurisprudence. 140
Referring to the DOL commentaries, 14 1 the court decided that, in
determining whether an entity is an employer, the proper standard is
"whether the entity was "engaged in business" during the time prior to
the plant closing or mass layoff,"l 42 and the relevant issue is whether
United, as a debtor in possession, was "operating as an ongoing business
enterprise," or was merely "engaged in the liquidation of assets." 43
Disagreeing with the bankruptcy court's finding that United remained an
135.

Id.

136.

Id.at 176.

137. Id. The WARN Act language that the court analyzed was, "any business enterprise that
employs (A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or (B) 100 or more employees
who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week ..... Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 176-77.
141. "The term "employer" incudes public and quasi-public entities which engage in business
(i.e., take part in commercial or industrial enterprise, supply a service or good on a mercantile basis,
or provide independent management of public assets, raising revenue and making desired
investments) . . . ." Id. at 177.
142. Id.
143. Id. The court derived this issue from the portion of the DOL commentary that states, "a
fiduciary whose sole function in the bankruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business for the
benefit of creditors does not succeed to the [WARN] notice obligations of the former employer
because the fiduciary is not operating a "business enterprise" in the normal commercial sense." Id.
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employer when, as a "debtor in possession," it employed the "debtor's"
1,300 employees to continue work on a daily basis, the court decided to
apply a sliding scale test. 1"
III. HOLDING: APPLICATION OF THE SLIDING SCALE TEST
In re United Healthcare stands for the general proposition that the
determination of whether a bankrupt entity is an employer under the
WARN Act depends on "the nature and extent of the entity's business
and commercial activities while in bankruptcy, and not merely on
whether the entity's employees continue to work "on a daily basis.""l 45
In a not-so-successful attempt to clarify this rule, the court opined that
"the more closely the entity's activities resemble those of a business
operating as a going concern, the more likely it is that the entity is an
"employer,"" and "the more closely the activities resemble those of a
business winding up its affairs, the more likely it is the entity is not
subject to the WARN Act."1 4 6
Applying this sliding scale test, the court concluded that United was
operating as a business liquidating its affairs rather than as a business
operating as a going concern. In making this determination, the court
found it relevant that on February 18, United surrendered its certificates
of need, and, on February 19, filed its petition in bankruptcy with the
intent to liquidate its assets and cease to exist.147 Sometime between
February 18 and 21, United's employees were no longer engaged in
regular duties, but were instead working solely to prepare United for
liquidation.148 During the same period of time, United discharged or
transferred all of its patients and stopped accepting new patients.149
Taking all of this into account, the court found its analysis consistent
144. While it is a somewhat outdated principle in bankruptcy law, some courts have recognized
the fictional distinction between a debtor and a debtor in possession. See e.g. In the Matter ofPease,
195 BR. 431, 433 (D. Neb. 1996) ("The Chapter 11 debtor is a separate and distinct entity from the
pre-bankruptcy debtor because before the bankruptcy case is filed, the debtor does not hold the
rights of a debtor in possession and does not hold fiduciary duties to creditors").
145. In re United, 200 F.3d at 178.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court recognized that while United filed for Chapter 11, which is ordinarily used
to reorganize, rather than Chapter 7, which is ordinarily used to liquidate, United's actions from the
time it filed its Chapter 11 petition throughout the proceedings clearly demonstrated its intent to
liquidate. Relevant to this determination was the court's statement that "[h]ad United Healthcare's
conduct and activities demonstrated a bona fide effort toward reorganization, the evidence may have
shown that United Healthcare was an "employer" subject to the WARN Act." Id.

148.
149.

Id.
Id.
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with the legislative purpose of the WARN Act, and referred to previous
Third Circuit cases in which courts held that:
WARN's notice period was designed to allow workers to "adjust to the
prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain retraining that will
allow [them] to successfully compete in the job market." The thrust of
WARN is to give fair warning in advance of prospective plant
closings. It would appear, therefore, that if an employer knew of a ...
closing and failed to notify its employees, the WARN Act would
apply.
Applying this standard to United, the court found that there was no
evidence that United knew in advance that it would be forced to close its
doors, and concealed that fact from its employees. 151 Rather, United
made repeated good-faith efforts to stay financially viable in hopes of
allowing its employees to keep their jobs. 152 United also willingly
informed its merger partner that it was experiencing financial
The court ultimately found determinative that, because
difficulties.'
United was merely preparing for liquidationl 54 and did not file for
bankruptcy "in an effort to avoid its WARN Act responsibilities," 5 5 it
did not continue as an employer "when it assumed the role of fiduciary
following the filing for bankruptcy," and was therefore not subject to
WARN Act liability. 156
In re United Healthcare is the seminal example of a successful
application of the liquidating fiduciary exception. In re Jamesway,5 7 on
the other hand, is a clear example of when the exception does not apply.
A. In re Jamesway
In In re Jamesway, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 178-79.
153. Id. at 179.
154. Id. The court also considered the fact that the actual bankruptcy plan that United filed
along with its petition indicated that United planned to sell its goodwill to St. Barnabas and that
United itself would cease to exist. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Perhaps germane to court's precedential relevance, footnote 10 states: "[w]e express
no opinion on whether United incurred WARN liabilities at some point prior to the filing of its
petition and whether the United employees have WARN claims entitled to priority under Section
507(a)(3)." Id
157. Barnett v. Jamesway Corp. (In re Jamesway Corp.), 235 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999).
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of New York held that an employer was subject to WARN Act liability
where the WARN Act violations took place prior to filing a petition in
bankruptcy."' The case arose when Jamesway fired 260 of its 550 fulltime employees between October 12 and November 11, 1995.159 Six
days after it had already started terminating its employees, Jamesway
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 160 The employees sued Jamesway
claiming that Jamesway violated the WARN Act when it fired the
employees without giving advance notice of the terminations.161 The
parties agreed that, for purposes of the WARN Act, and at all relevant
times, Jamesway was an "employer;" the plaintiffs were "affected
employees;" and Jamesway's terminations constituted either a "plant
closing" or "mass layoff."1 62 The parties also agreed that Jamesway had
not given any of the plaintiffs the required sixty-day notice of

termination. 163
Jamesway first argued that it was not required to give WARN
notice because it ceased operating due to "not reasonably foreseeable
business circumstances"1 64 and/or because it was a "faltering
company."165 While Jamesway contended that it gave the employees "as

much notice as was practicable" before firing them, it conceded that it
did not give notice to the employees that it fired between October 12 and
October 18, 1995.6

Jamesway also contended that it gave adequate

notice to the employees that were fired after October 18 because several
of Jamesway's security guards distributed and posted WARN notices
around the corporate headquarters, all on the day that Jamesway
conducted the terminations.16 7 For several reasons, the court found that
158. Id. at 346.
159. Id. at 335.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 337.
163. Id.
164. Id. To qualify for this exception, an employer that shut down an employment site before
the conclusion of the 60-day period must show that it was "actively seeking capital or business
which, if obtained would have enabled the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown and the
employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice required would have
precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or business." Id.
165. Id. To qualify for this exception, an employer that ordered a plant closing or mass layoff
before the conclusion of the 60-day period must show that the closing or layoff was "caused by
business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would have
been required." Id

166.

Id

167. Id. at 337-38.The court disregarded this contention, noting that Jamesway produced no
evidence to show that the security guards either posted WARN notices or disseminated them to any
of the employees; Jamesway produced no evidence that any of the employees actually received a
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Jamesway failed to give WARN notice to any of the employees prior to
firing them,'16 and that Jamesway's grasping-at-straws contention that it
gave "after the fact" WARN notice held no merit.169
As a secondary argument, Jamesway contended that it was exempt
from WARN Act requirements and that the employees' complaint
should have been dismissed because by the time Jamesway filed for
bankruptcy on October 18, it was already a liquidating fiduciary. 7 e
Jamesway admitted that it did not give the proper WARN Act notice
copy of the purported notice (In fact, at least two of the employees denied receiving it); and
Jamesway failed to produce an actual copy of the notice, and never even attempted to prove its
contents. Id. Citing 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(d), the court noted that the specific notice requirements
under the WARN Act were not satisfied. Id. at 340. That section states, as follows:
Notice to each affected employee who does not have a representative is to be written in
language understandable to the employees and is to contain: (1) A statement as to
whether the planned action is permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be
closed, as statement to that effect; (2) The expected date when a plant closing or mass
layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be
separated; ... (4) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for
further information.
Id. at 340. Jamesway's letters did not satisfy WARN requirements because they inaccurately
advised that Jamesway would terminate 50 employees on October 13, while Jamesway actually
fired 144 employees. Id. at 341. The letters also omitted the name and phone number of a company
official and failed to identify the job titles that would be affected by the employment decision. Id.
168. Id. at 338. The court, in a footnote, acknowledged the fact that notice must be served
"pursuant to "any reasonable method of delivery."" See 20 C.F.R § 639.8, provided that the
selected method is "designed to insure receipt of notice [at] least 60 days before separation . . . (e.g.,
first class mail, personal delivery with option signed receipt) . . . ."" Id. at 338. The employees also
contended that even if the security guards did post or disseminate the notices, the court must grant
them judgment on their complaint because even those acts would not satisfy the WARN Act's
notice requirements. Id. The court, however, declined to address this issue because of Jamesway's
outright failure to show that the guards posted or disseminated any notices that complied with the
WARN Act. Id.
169. Id. at 339. Jamesway contended that it gave the employees "after the fact" WARN notice
for three reasons. First, it was uncontested that On October 27, 1995, Jamesway sent a letter and
check for the full amount due to each of the non-union employees that were fired on or after
October 12 for accrued vacation, severance, and medical reimbursement. Id. at 338. Second, it was
uncontested that on November 17, Jamesway sent another letter to each of those employees
explaining the procedure for paying mitigated severance to those who had not yet found new jobs.
Id. And finally, it was uncontested that in December 1995, Jamesway sent letters to the same
employees regarding Jamesway's pension plan. Id. at 339. The court found that these claims held
no merit even assuming that the "not reasonably foreseeable business circumstance," or "faltering
company" exceptions applied because the WARN Act only allows for "after the fact" notice when a
natural disaster causes the plant closing or mass layoff. Id. Finally, the court found it relevant that
Jamesway was aware of its WARN obligations, was capable of complying with them, and still
failed to do so. Id. at 343. Jamesway conceded that by September 29, it had already started to
consider filing for Chapter 11, and that the purpose of filing might be to liquidate the company. Id.
at 342. Jamesway clearly knew of the WARN Act requirements, and even considered giving early
notice to its employees in anticipation of the terminations. Id.
170. Id. at 337.
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during its pre-petition terminations, but again contended that the postpetition firings were preceded by the proper employee notifications
because Jamesway's security guards posted WARN notices at its
corporate headquarters on the same day as the layoffs. 17 1 Jamesway's
main contention was that:
[I]mmediately subsequent to the commencement of its [nonbankruptcy] liquidation and shutdown, and the resultant termination of
its employees, [Jamesway's] efforts were geared [solely] towards
finalizing and planning, documentation and other advance activities
necessary to file its liquidating chapter 11 case so that its liquidation
could proceed in an orderly manner.
Once it began the Chapter 11 liquidation, Jamesway argued that it
became the liquidating fiduciary of a failed business and therefore did
not succeed to the notice obligations of the pre-bankruptcy entity."' In
response, the employees contended that Jamesway was not a liquidating
fiduciary at the time of the firings because it "continued its normal
business operations until at least November 3, 1995 by conducting postpetition going out of business sales at its store location.174 The court
found, however, that even if Jamesway was a liquidating fiduciary, there
was no reason to make a determination because Jamesway was
nevertheless liable under the WARN Act. "
The court went on to deny Jamesway's access to the liquidating
fiduciary exception for several additional reasons. Jamesway admitted
the fact that its directors voted to liquidate the company and authorized
Jamesway to file a liquidating Chapter 11 case. ' It also conceded that
when it fired the employees, it did so to further its liquidation efforts. 77
By that time, Jamesway had already identified all of the plaintiffs as
employees who would lose their jobs in the pending liquidation, and had
even created a schedule for conducting the layoffs.17 ' The court found
that the plaintiffs were clearly owed notice of the layoffs because they

171.
172.

Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 338.

173. Id. at 343 (citing Fed Reg. 16,045 (1989)) ("[A] bankruptcy fiduciary whose sole
function is to liquidate a failed business for the benefit of creditors does not succeed to the former
employers' WARN obligations").
174. Id. at 343

175.

Id.

176.
177.
178.

Id
Id
Id.
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were "affected employees" under the WARN Act. 179 That is, they were
employees who "may [have] reasonably [been] expected to experience
an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or
mass layoff by the employer."180 Ultimately the court held that, at the
time Jamesway failed to give proper notice, Jamesway became liable to
the employees under the explicit language of the WARN Act, and that
the subsequent bankruptcy petition did not relieve it of its WARN Act
obligations to those employees.s18
Interestingly, in its final attempt to circumvent WARN Act liability,
Jamesway argued that the employees' complaint should be dismissed
because the company acted in "good faith with reasonable grounds for
believing that it was not violating the [WARN] act."l 8 2 Jamesway
supported this contention by arguing that it relied in good faith on the
advice of its counsel, and determined that its acts were in line with the
requirements set forth in the WARN Act. 8 3 The court rejected this
argument for several reasons including the fact that Jamesway had
produced no evidence to show that it had any good faith belief that the
letters it provided its employees satisfied the WARN Act's
requirements. 184 In fact, after considering circumstantial evidence, the
court was persuaded that Jamesway might not have had a subjective
belief that it was complying with the WARN Act at all.18' The
circumstantial evidence was based on the fact that Jamesway was aware
of its WARN notice obligations prior to terminating any of the plaintiffs,
and it was capable of providing WARN notice but failed to do so. 86
Furthermore, Jamesway argued that once it filed its petition in
bankruptcy on October 18, it believed that it was not subject to any
ongoing obligations to give notice under the WARN Act.1 87 Jamesway,
however, provided no rationale for that understanding, or any support
that it had any role in Jamesway's decision to decide not to give its postpetition employees the required WARN Act notice before firing them.' 8 8
179. Id. at 342-43.

180.

Id. citing 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (2006); see also 20 C.F.R. §639.6(b) (2013).

181. Id.at343-44.
182. Id. at 344 (citing 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(4) (2006)) (stating that if an employer can prove, to
the satisfaction of the court, that the act or omission violated was in good faith, the court may
reduce the liability or penalty).
183. Id. at 345.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 346.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id "Good faith requires an honest intent to ascertain the requirements of the statute and
to act accordingly." Id. (citing Washington v. Aircap Industries, 860 F. Supp. 307, 315-16 (D. S.C.
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The court also declined to consider the fact that Jamesway assisted the
terminated employees after Jamesway filed for bankruptcy, finding that
"Jamesway's post-termination conduct has no bearing on whether it
possessed a good faith belief that its acts satisfied its WARN notice
obligations at the time notice was required to be given."' 89 Finally, the
court found that even if Jamesway had a good faith belief in its counsel's
advice that the letters complied with the WARN Act because Jamesway
fell within the "faltering company" or "not reasonably foreseeable
business circumstance" exceptions, this belief was "clearly
unreasonable."' 90 The "statutes, regulations, and case law" that were
available to Jamesway when it ordered the employee terminations all
stated in clear terms that employers must provide to the employees basic
WARN notice and a brief statement of why reduced notice is necessary
in order to qualify for the exceptions listed in the WARN Act. 191
B. Where do United Healthcareand Jamesway Leave Us?
Based on the holdings in United Healthcare and Jamesway, the
general rule appears to be that employers are only eligible for the
liquidating fiduciary exception when they conduct their layoffs or plant
closings post-petition.192 That is, a pre-petition employer that decides to
initiate a mass layoff cannot successfully use the liquidating fiduciary
exception because the very fact that the employer has not yet filed a
liquidating Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition means that the employer is
not legally recognized as a liquidating fiduciary.19 3 Rather, a prepetition employer is considered to be engaged in the continuing
operation of its business as a business enterprise, and is therefore subject

to WARN Act obligations under the language of 29 USCS § 2101(a).194
Even post-petition employers, it appears, are sometimes outside the
scope of the liquidating fiduciary exception even though they are acting
solely as fiduciaries in the process of winding up the employer's
1994); see also Carpenter's Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't. Stores Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1287-88 (51
Cir. 1994); United Paperworkers v. Alden, 901 F. Supp. 426, 443 (D. Mass. 1995); Local 1239 v.
Allsteel, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill 1996) ("good faith intent to comply with the WARN Act
requires requisite notice, and not waiting until the plant closing or layoff is likely. Instead the
employer must give the notice when the plant closing is foreseeable").
189. Id.
190. Id. at 347.
191. Id
192. See supranote 86 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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business affairs. These circumstances of course include employers that
filed their bankruptcy petitions with the intent to reorganize rather than
liquidate their businesses because these employers would not be able to
contend that they were operating as liquidating fiduciaries when the
challenged layoffs took place. Furthermore, under In re Jamesway, it
seems that even a post-petition employer that is attempting to liquidate
its assets might still be barred from asserting the liquidating fiduciary
exception if the bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith in order to
circumvent WARN Act obligations.195
While there is currently a dearth of case law to aid in sharpening
the lines of the liquidating fiduciary exception, there may be some
helpful new interpretations on the horizon. One example is a WARN Act
class action case from the Southern District of New York involving the
prestigious ex-law firm, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP.'9 '
III. INREDEWEY & LEBOEUF: CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE

EXCEPTION

As with any underdeveloped legal issue, it will be interesting to see
how the liquidating fiduciary exception changes shape as it gets sifted
through different circuits and applied to different sets of facts. In
February 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York came across a potential liquidating fiduciary exception issue in a
WARN Act class action case against the infamous Dewey & LeBoeuf
LLP Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.197
In re Dewey & LeBoeuf is currently in the pleading stage of trial. 98
The case involves a motion to dismiss filed by the debtor - Dewey &
LeBoeuf ("Dewey").199 While the court ultimately denied the motion,
finding that the liquidating fiduciary exception is not determinative on a
motion to dismiss, it did recognize that "[Dewey] may ultimately prevail
on the liquidating fiduciary affirmative defense."2 00
The case arose on May 7, 2012 when Vittoria Conn was fired from
her job at Dewey's New York office.20 ' On May 10, 2012, Conn, on

195.

InreJamesway Corp., 235 B.R. at346.

196. Conn v. Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, (In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP), 487 B.R. 169 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2013).

197.
198.
199.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 169.

200.
201.

Id. at 171.
Id.
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behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, filed an action against
Dewey in the District Court for the Southern District of New York
seeking relief for alleged violations of the WARN Act.202 The complaint
specifically alleged that the plaintiffs were terminated without cause as
part of mass layoffs or plant closings, and were not given the required
WARN notice.203 On May 28, 2012, Dewey filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition with the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York, and, on December 14 of the same year, filed its motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 04
One of Dewey's primary arguments in favor of dismissal is that no
substantive WARN Act violation could possibly have taken place
because Dewey falls within what the court recognized as the "so-called
liquidating fiduciary principle." 205 The court noted that "case law
establishes that defendant may only be liable under the WARN Acts if it
is an "employer" operating a "business enterprise.""20 6 Dewey
contended that it no longer fit those requirements once it terminated the
employees, and that it therefore is not liable under the WARN Act.207 In
opposition, however, Conn pointed out that Dewey failed to deny that
the complaint contains the requisite "short and plain statement of facts
setting forth a claim for relief,"208 and that a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) is therefore inappropriate. 2 09 Dewey argued that, even if
the complaint does state a proper claim for relief, Dewey "did not meet
the definition of "employer" under the WARN Acts" at the time of the
layoffs because "it was no longer operating in an ordinary business sense
when it laid off its employees." 210 In response, Conn argued that even if
Dewey was not operating in an ordinary business sense at the time of the
layoffs, the liquidating fiduciary exception is inappropriate because it
only applies to claims for terminations that occurred after the petition
was filed, and in this case the layoffs took place entirely pre-petition.211
Interestingly, the court disagreed and cited In re Healthcarefor the

202. Id.
203. Id. The class action complaint alleged violations of the Federal WARN Act (60 days'
notice), the New York WARN Act (90 days' notice), and the California WARN Act (60 days'
notice). Id. at 171-72.
204. Id. at 172.
205. Id. at 173.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.

209.

Id.

210.
211.

Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
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proposition that "not all cases applying the [liquidating fiduciary]
principle involve post-petition terminations, and the petition date is not
determinative of the outcome in all cases." 2 12
Ultimately, however, the court held that "no case law supports
granting a motion to dismiss based on the liquidating fiduciary principle
where the terminations occurred pre-petition and there is a factual
dispute whether the debtor was operating as a going concern at the time
of the terminations." 2 13 In this case, Conn's complaint stated a plausible
claim for relief,2 14 and because all factual allegations must be accepted
as true on a motion to dismiss, the court did not have the authority to
resolve the factual issue of whether Dewey was operating as a
liquidating fiduciary at the time of the layoffs.2 15
A. PotentialEffect of In re Dewey & LeBoeuf
It seems that one of the most significant parts of In re Dewey is not
its rejection of the liquidating fiduciary exception on a motion to
dismiss, but rather the court's statement that "the Debtor may ultimately
prevail on the liquidating fiduciary [exception as an] affirmative
defense." 2 16
This appears to be express acknowledgment and
encouragement by a well respected bankruptcy court that Dewey has an
actual chance of circumventing its WARN Act obligations under the
liquidating fiduciary exception in a case where the employer's layoffs
217
took place pre-petition.
If Dewey does, in fact, raise the liquidating
fiduciary exception as an affirmative defense, the court will have to
conduct a very close factual inquiry to determine whether Dewey, in its
final days as a pre-petition employer, found itself so geared towards
winding up its affairs that it actually ceased to operate as a business

212. Id at 175. This assertion is interesting for several reasons. First, the court is noting a
possible expansion of the liquidating fiduciary exception, which is typically understood to apply
only to cases involving post-petition layoffs. Id. Second, the court cites In re Healthcareto support
this point, even though that case represents the successful application of the liquidating fiduciary
exception under circumstances where the layoffs took place post-petition. Id The contradiction is
difficult to reconcile at this point; the court is either recognizing a possibility that an employer does
not have to be in bankruptcy to be a liquidating fiduciary, or, in the alternative, simply misapplying
In re Healthcare.Id.
213. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
214. See id. at 176. Dewey terminated the employees within one month before the Chapter 11
filing, and failed to comply with the WARN Act's notice requirement. Id. at 171-72, 174.
215. Id at 171-72, 174.
216. Id. at 171.
217. Id.
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enterprise, and instead became a pre-bankruptcy liquidating fiduciary.2 18
Under those circumstances, struggling employers from around the
country would be wise to actively track the court's analysis. A decision
out of the Southern District of New York on a case as widely recognized
as Dewey's will be sure to have a significant impact on employers,
whether struggling or healthy, trying to figure out when to fire
employees or close plants. If the court ultimately finds that Dewey is
not liable for failing to satisfy its WARN Act obligations, and therefore
that it was a liquidating fiduciary before ever filing for bankruptcy, it
could potentially mark the beginning of a slew of liquidating fiduciary
affirmative defense claims to allegations of WARN Act violations, and
therefore an impetus to start developing this legal issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the looming uncertainty of today's economic climate, it is
more important than ever to understand the implications of layoffs, plant
shutdowns, and bankruptcy filings. This is especially true when the
implications are viewed in relation to each other. The general premise is
that employers considering mass layoffs or plant shutdowns might well
benefit from the currently developing law surrounding the WARN Act,
or, more specifically, the liquidating fiduciary exception to WARN Act
liability. While current case law on the subject is relatively sparse, the
decisions in United HealthCareand Jamesway serve as reliable starting
points. These cases are significant not only because of the impact they
have on WARN Act claims against Chapter 11 debtors in possession,
but also because of the impact they might have on employers' layoff and
plant closing decisions. That is, an analysis of the courts' interpretations
of the liquidating fiduciary exception can offer an extraordinary amount
of insight to employers deciding whether to conduct their layoffs or
plant closings before or after filing for bankruptcy.
Moreover, based on future findings of the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York in In re Dewey (where the employees are
alleging that Dewey violated the WARN Act pre-petition), the impact of
the liquidating fiduciary exception could soon be gaining even more
traction. So far, In re Dewey has only produced the unsurprising rule
that liquidating fiduciary defenses to WARN Act liability, which require
fact intensive analyses, do not apply to employers in the motion to
dismiss stage of trial, where factual allegations are necessarily accepted
218.

Id. at 175.
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as true. But based on the Bankruptcy Court's treatment of the
liquidating fiduciary exception, and its overt acknowledgment that the
liquidating fiduciary exception, if raised as an affirmative defense, could
potentially spell a victory for Dewey, the court's ultimate decision on the
merits could largely develop the scope of the liquidating fiduciary
exception as we currently know it.
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